The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action by Yelnosky, Michael J.
The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action
MICHAEL J. YELNOSKY*
An impressive body of research shows that minorities and women are less likely
to succeed in workplaces where they are present in token numbers.
Discrimination is more likely to hold back blacks and women in workforces with
a dramatic racial or gender imbalance. Thus, an employer seeking to prevent
future discrimination in the workplace might use preferences to achieve a better
racial or gender balance.
The Supreme Court has consistently explained that the primary purpose of
Title VII is to encourage employers to prevent workplace discrimination. An
affirmative action plan that used preferences to achieve a better racial or gender
balance would be consistent with that purpose. More importantly, a close look at
the Court's Title VI affirmative action jurisprudence reveals that this
"prevention justification" is consistent with existing doctrine. The Article
concludes with a detailed explanation of whether and how an affirmative action
plan aimed at preventing future discrimination could satisfy existing Title VII
doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination against blacks and women is responsible in part
for several persistent labor market phenomena: differential work force
participation rates, differential earnings, and job segregation.' There is
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Miceli, and Damian Shammas for their research assistance. Thanks also to participants in the
Research Conference on Behavioral Analyses of Workplace Discrimination and a Labor and
Employment Law Workshop, both sponsored by the Center for Labor and Employment Law at
New York University School of Law. Participants in a legal theory workshop at Seton Hall
University School of Law first encouraged me to pursue this project.
I While other forces are no doubt responsible for these disparities, including differences in
education, training, worker preferences, and geographic proximity to jobs, studies continue to
show discrimination persists. See, e.g., MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN,
ARE EMILY AND BRENDAN MORE EMPLOYABLE THAN LAKISHA & JAMAL? A FIELD
EXPERIMENT ON LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9873, 2003) (showing a significant gap in the rate of callback interviews for similarly
situated applicants with black- as opposed to white-sounding names and showing that black
applicants benefit less than white applicants from improved credentials); William A. Darity &
Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of
Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1998) (reviewing statistical research, court cases, and audit
studies); Cynthia L. Estlund, Work and Family: How Women's Progress at Work (and
Employment Discrimination Law) May be Transforming the Family, 21 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 467, 468 (2000) (explaining that gender-based differences in workforce participation,
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an extensive literature urging modification of Title VII doctrine to further reduce
the role of discrimination in producing these differential outcomes.2 However,
many acknowledge that fine-tuning the doctrine will likely achieve only modest
goals because the disparate treatment and disparate impact conceptions of
discrimination are underinclusive. Cognitive biases not captured by the concept of
disparate treatment and workplace structures and practices not subject to attack
via disparate impact doctrine stand in the way of equal employment opportunity.
3
Some commentators have therefore urged aggressive reconfiguration of Title VII
doctrine to reflect a more complete understanding of discrimination. However, as
I have written elsewhere, I am skeptical about the efficacy of an approach to equal
employment opportunity primarily focused on making it easier for Title VII
plaintiffs to prevail in court. While the limitations of existing doctrine are
increasingly apparent, insights about the nature of discrimination and the reality
of Title VII enforcement might be more effectively brought to bear in the form of
alternatives or adjuncts to traditional Title VII enforcement.4
This Article is part of that ongoing project. Here I consider the implications
of a broader conception of discrimination for employers' voluntary
incomes, and segregation are "still formidable"); CLAUDIA GOLDIN & CECILIA ROUSE,
ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY: THE IMPACT OF "BLIND" AUDITIONS ON FEMALE MUSICIANS
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5903, 1997) (concluding that much of the
increase--between 25% and 550/o-in the number of female musicians in the top five
symphony orchestras in the United States can be explained by the use of "blind" auditions with
a screen to conceal the identity of the candidate from the selectors); Anne Lawton, The
Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587,
599-602 (2000) (reviewing study results); Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity,
and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 974-76 (1997) (showing that the black
middle class is occupationally disadvantaged compared to the white middle class); DAVID
NEUMARK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION IN RESTAURANT HIRING: AN AUDIT STUDY (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5024, 1995) (reporting results of a small-scale
audit study of 65 restaurants in Philadelphia showing statistically significant evidence of sex
discrimination against women applying for server positions in high-price and higher-earnings
restaurants and weaker evidence of discrimination in favor of women in low-price restaurants);
Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 743-50 (2000)
(discussing the contributory role of statistical discrimination in the gender wage gap).
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REv. 583, 588-97 (reviewing some of this literature).
3 See Linda Hamilton Kreiger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1304 (1998) [hereinafter Perestroika].
4 See Yelnosky, supra note 2; Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void. Using
Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs,
26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403 (1993); Michael J. Yelnosky, Mediation?, 53 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF.
ON LAB. (David Sherwyn ed., forthcoming 2003); Michael J. Yelnosky, Salvaging the
Opportunity: A Response to Professor Clark, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 151 (1994); Michael J.
Yelnosky, Using Mediation to Resolve Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Discrimination Charges, in WILEY EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 21 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed.
1995).
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antidiscrimination efforts. Understanding the ways in which cognitive biases and
workplace structures stand as obstacles to the advancement of women and
minorities has important implications for affirmative action in employment. This
broader conception suggests that employers could use gender or racial
preferences in their efforts to prevent discrimination against women and racial
minorities.
Essential to this "prevention justification" for affirmative action is
appreciation of some of the theoretical and empirical research in cognitive
psychology and organizational behavior. I explore that body of work in the first
part of this Article. One important insight of this research is that in workplaces
where women or minorities are present in small numbers, they are less likely to
succeed than if they constitute a larger share of the workforce. "Token status"
itself triggers stereotyping and leads to other predictable behaviors by co-
employees and tokens that make success for tokens less likely. This point is
central to the claim that employers could prevent some workplace discrimination
by consciously increasing the number of blacks or women in their workplaces.
But using preferences to increase minority or female representation in a
workforce is often not enough to prevent future discrimination. The specific way
in which preferences are used and the context in which they are used is important.
Moreover, employers can make race- or sex-neutral changes in standard operating
procedures that can reduce the likelihood of discrimination. An effective
discrimination prevention program would thus focus both on relative numbers
and on other steps that reduce the likelihood that bias would affect decision
making.
I next show that such an approach to preventing workplace discrimination is
surprisingly consistent with current Title VII doctrine. Since Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 5 its first decision interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court has
regularly pronounced that a primary purpose of Title VII is to encourage
employers to take steps to prevent workplace discrimination. Most recently the
Court has been even more emphatic about that prophylactic purpose. In a series of
recent decisions it has encouraged and perhaps required employers to take steps to
prevent discrimination by making liability for certain types of sexual harassment
and for punitive damages depend on the reasonableness of an employer's
discrimination prevention efforts.
Thus, I show how a court could conclude that an affirmative action plan with
a goal of preventing discrimination "mirrored the purposes of Title VII," a current
doctrinal requirement. I conclude this Part by showing that this fit between the
prevention justification and the purposes of Title VII is tighter than the fit
between the purposes of Title VII and the two most commonly asserted
justifications for affirmative action in employment: (1) the remedial justification;
and (2) the diversity justification.
5 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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The Article concludes with a more detailed discussion of how a
discrimination prevention program that incorporated race- or sex-conscious
preferences would fare in light of the "proper purpose" requirement, and in light
of the Supreme Court's other requirement for an affirmative action plan under
Title VII-that the plan not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminority
employees." The justification fares well, on balance, but not without
qualification. Under existing law, an employer may use preferences where there is
a manifest imbalance between the gender or racial composition of the employer's
workforce and the relevant labor pool, and the employer may use those
preferences to attain something closer to proportional representation in its work
force. The prevention justification, by contrast, would permit an employer to use
preferences if there is an imbalance between the numbers of blacks and whites in
its workforce, regardless of their relative representation in the relevant labor pool.
Moreover, it could authorize the employer to attain more than proportional
representation of blacks in its workforce-representation that exceeds "token
status." These are doctrinal shifts, and they are not exactly subtle, but they would
not require reworking existing law and its focus on identifying (1) numerical
underrepresentation, and (2) targets for more balanced representation.
All things considered, I am convinced that this approach warrants close
analysis. It is consistent with a body of existing research and mostly consistent
with existing law. My suggested approach is actually more modest than existing
law in one sense-it requires employers who use preferences to do so only in the
context of a transparent and comprehensive discrimination prevention program.
The essence of my argument is quite simple. The full flourishing of efforts at
discrimination prevention requires paying attention to relative numbers and doing
so is consistent with existing doctrine.6
6 The long gestation period of this Article can partly be explained by my reluctance to
enter into a conversation-the one about affirmative action-that can seem "repetitive, and
morbidly so." Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1845 (1996).
However, I am certain we have not been here before.
A few scholars have, without elaboration, stated that affirmative action might prevent
discrimination. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 113-14
(1996); Fran Ansley, Classifying Race, Racializing Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1020
(1997); Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decisionmaking
Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1003, 1048-49 (1997). A few others have offered a brief
sketch of how affirmative action might do so. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to be
Carefully Taught ": Justifying Affirmative Action After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REv.
1141, 1174-80 (1996) (arguing that the government can implement programs designed to
counteract "unconscious" or "institutional" racism so long as those programs do not employ
racial preferences but are limited to steps to alert decision makers to the possibility that they are
acting in a biased manner); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1080-82
(1995) (explaining that the "status-production model of discrimination" suggests affirmative
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II. FOUNDATIONS OF "THE PREVENTION JUSTIFICATION" FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of The Prevention Justification
A body of work from various disciplines shows that much stereotyping is
ordinary, automatic, and unconscious. It is also contextual: the environment in
and processes by which decisions are made can increase or decrease the
likelihood that stereotyping will adversely affect a particular decision. These
principles form the basis of the claim that employers could take steps, including
making race- or sex-conscious employment decisions, to decrease the likelihood
that stereotyping will lead to adverse outcomes for women or minorities in their
organizations.
The foundational work here is Rosabeth Kanter's 1977 book, Men and
Women of the Corporation.7 Kanter's study of a large multinational firm
concluded that the firm's organization and the distribution of people within it
contributed to the inferior status of women there. 8 In expanding on this
action might combat discrimination because bringing blacks into groups that would otherwise
be all-white makes it difficult for the whites to harm black members of the group without also
hurting themselves); cf Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the
Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1277-314 (1995) (arguing that a profit-
maximizing employer might implement an affirmative action program to overcome the
efficiency losses caused by persistent workplace discrimination, including unconscious
discrimination, and that under Bakke these benefits to the firm would serve as a legal
justification for the use of affirmative action).
I offer here the first thorough discussion of the theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal
justifications for and implications of a discrimination prevention program that, in part, uses
racial or gender preferences to increase the number of blacks or women in a workplace.
My discussion is limited to affirmative action to prevent discrimination against blacks and
women, although I am not precluding application of the same approach to other protected
classes under antidiscrimination law. The social science on which the approach is based focuses
mainly on blacks and women, as do the only two Supreme Court decisions ruling on the
legality of affirmative action in employment under Title VII. For a detailed discussion of the
standard categories used in affirmative action plans, see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative
Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2002).
7 ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1993 ed.).
Although discussion of the effects of differences in proportional representation within
collectives did not begin with Kanter, her treatment provided a useful theoretical framework for
the area of inquiry and has spawned a considerable amount of literature. See Pamela Braboy
Jackson et al., Composition of the Workplace and Psychological Well-Being: The Effects of
Tokenism on America's Black Elite, 74 Soc. FORCES 543 (1995).
8 KANTER, supra note 7, at xv. Kanter saw herself as exploring the effects of
"structuralism," which she described as the way in which worker consciousness and behavior
are formed by experiences in organizations. Id.
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"distributional" point, Kanter emphasized the relative representation of men and
women in the organization. "Token" status, "rarity," and "scarcity" of women
powerfully shaped, she explained, the behavior of both women and men in an
organization. Kanter referred to members of any group that represented less than
approximately 15% of the workforce as "tokens." 9 She found that tokens are
regularly stereotyped and viewed as representatives of their category because
there are not a sufficient number of individuals to easily defeat generalizations
about their behavior.'0 Tokens are thus more likely to be forced into limited and
caricatured roles, a process Kanter referred to as "role encapsulation". 11 She also
found that when tokens are introduced into a previously homogeneous work
group, dominants tend to exaggerate their own commonality to distinguish
themselves from tokens, whose differences from the dominants are also
exaggerated. 12 Moreover, the visibility of tokens increases performance pressure
and stress because it is more likely people will notice a token's performance.
In short, according to Kanter:
People whose type are present in small numbers tend to be more visible, feel
pressure to conform, often try to become invisible, find it hard to gain credibility,
feel isolated and peripheral, can be excluded from informal peer networks, have
fewer opportunities to be sponsored, face stress, and are often stereotyped. 13
Thus, for Kanter, the number of men and women in particular jobs is most
important not because those numbers might be signs of discrimination in an
organization, 14  but because stereotyping, work performance, promotion
9/d at 208.
l0 Id at 210-11.
I I Id at 230.
12 Id. at 222-25. She found that the resulting isolation of tokens made it quite difficult for
them to develop the mentoring and sponsorship relationships with dominants that are often
essential to success in organizations. Id. at 220-21, 230.
13 Id. at 248. These dynamics of tokenism, Kanter explained, seemed more dramatic in
managerial jobs, where the exercise of discretion is essential and a premium is thus placed on
homogeneity and conformity, which are seen as proxies for loyalty, trustworthiness, and ease of
communication. Id at 49-68.
14 Cf Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977). The
Court stated:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are... often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired.
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prospects, and psychic distress often depend on relative numbers. 15 This
proposition-that changing the racial or gender composition of the workplace will
change the way in which organizational rewards are distributed-has been
referred to as Kanter's "redistributive hypothesis." As the ratio in a workgroup of
men and women reaches 65:35, she wrote, the effects of minority status are less
exaggerated: women become individuals differentiated from each other as well as
a type differentiated from the majority. Outcomes for individuals in such a group
will depend less on group membership and more on other personal factors,
including differentiated abilities.16 Numerous studies have confirmed, expanded,
and refined Kanter's theory.' 7 To summarize this body of work, the redistributive
15 KANTER, supra note 7, at 6, 242.
16 Id at 208-09. "Being part of a group represented in large numbers... increased the
odds of success without having to prove extraordinary competence. Being one of very
few... created special performance pressures which made it easier to be derailed." Id at 292.
17 See Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms:
Reevaluating Kanter's Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41 (2000) (finding that increased
representation of women, African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans at the partner
level of elite law firms was positively correlated with increased representation of members of
those groups at the associate level); Liliane Floge & Deborah M. Merrill, Tokenism
Reconsidered. Male Nurses and Female Physicians in a Hospital Setting, 64 Soc. FORCES 925
(1986) (finding that Kanter's hypothesis was overinclusive in that female physicians, and not
male nurses, were held back in career advancement by their token status); Dafia N. lzraeli, Sex
Effects or Structural Effects? An Empirical Test of Kanter's Theory of Proportions, 62 SOC.
FORCES 153 (1983) (finding support for Kanter's theory but noting that other institutional
factors influence the amount of diminution of sex stereotyping); Jackson et al., supra note 7
(finding that both token women and token blacks in "elite" positions are more likely to be
depressed and anxious than women and blacks in more balanced workplaces); Charles G. Lord
& Delia Saenz, Memory Deficits and Memory Surfeits: Differential Cognitive Consequences of
Tokenism for Tokens and Observers, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918 (1985)
(validating, in experimental setting, Kanter's observation that tokens and non-tokens attract
differentially attentive audiences); Eve Spangler et al., Token Women: An Empirical Test of
Kanter's Hypothesis, 84 Am. J. Soc. 160 (1978) (finding evidence that performance pressure,
social isolation, and role entrapment all operate to diminish the achievements of women law
students where they are only a small minority of the student body); Shelley E. Taylor et al.,
Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 778 (1978) (finding support for the hypothesis that salience, by virtue of
numerical distinctiveness, leads to exaggerated perceptions of prominence and exaggerated
evaluations); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 561 (1996) (reporting
that the number of black lawyers already working in a particular firm is positively correlated
with that firm's likelihood of hiring additional black attorneys and that the work lives of the few
black lawyers in large law firms support Kanter's findings about the effects of token status);
Janice D. Yoder, Looking Beyond Numbers: The Effects of Gender Status, Job Prestige, and
Occupational Gender-Typing on Tokenism Processes, 57 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 150 (1994)
(stating that Kanter's thesis has been demonstrated across a variety of token groups in a broad
range of occupations and finding support for the thesis in her own study, but noting that an
increase in proportional representation is not sufficient to rid workplaces of gender-based
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hypothesis Kanter articulated in a study of female tokens has been shown to affect
black tokens, token status has been shown to have less adverse impact on white
men, and while increasing the representation of blacks and women decreases the
negative impact of token status, it does not eliminate race- or gender-based
discrimination. 18
Other research, this in the area of sexual harassment, found that women
"pioneers," those among the first to enter male-dominated occupations, often
reported pervasive and severe harassment and hostility. 19 The more recent
research into this phenomenon confirms that women in male-dominated
workplaces experience more harassment than women in other workplaces and
that a gender imbalance in the workforce is a more likely predictor of sexual
harassment than the presence of a woman in a traditionally male job as measured
by national occupational statistics.20
In a pair of seminal articles, Linda Hamilton Krieger explained that research
in cognitive psychology helped explain the observations made and explanations
offered by Kanter and others, and she began to consider the implications of that
discrimination); see generally Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1195, 1214 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural
Domination Theories Meet Title VI: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370,
2381 (1994); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 91, 106 (2003); Stephen
C. Wright, Tokenism, Ambiguity and the Tolerance of Injustice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY 223-54 (John J. Jost & Brenda Major, eds., 2001).
18 See id
19 James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies
on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & SoC'Y 301, 306 (1998).
20 Id. (concluding that sexual harassment is more generally a function of workplace
dynamics than occupational membership-- "that what a woman does for a living is less
important than where she does her job"); See also Chamallas, supra note 17, at 2382-83;
Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83
MINN. L. REv. 305, 327 (1998) (noting an inverse relationship between the level of gender
integration and the level of sexual harassment); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and
Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (1997). That the number of women in a particular job category is
an important predictor of sexual harassment is a central aspect of Vicki Schultz's important
structural account of workplace sexual harassment. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1800-01 (1998) (proposing that courts in sexual
harassment cases should consider, for example, whether women were present in skewed sex
ratios, which meant they were likely to find themselves unwelcome among the men who
outnumbered them); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2177 (2003)
(arguing for a legal regime in which the more firms integrate women and men equally into all
lines of work and levels of authority, the less likely they will be to incur liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment).
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research for antidiscrimination law.21 The body of research Krieger shared with
the legal academy shows that much bias against women and minorities is not the
product of a corrupt choice to discriminate, but instead results from the natural
tendency of individuals to use categories. 22 Cognitive bias occurs, not
consciously at the time of the adverse decision, but unconsciously and
unintentionally when stereotypes caused by using categories (e.g., "man,"
"woman," "black," "white") subtly distort the way an employer perceives,
interprets, stores, and then recalls information about an individual's job
performance. Thus, at the moment of decision, biased decision makers can in
good faith believe their decisions are based on "the facts."
'23
Krieger explained that an important determinant of cognitive bias is salience.
Kanter had observed that token status affects performance evaluations, and
Kreiger showed that cognitive psychologists have explained why intergroup
ratings of tokens or solos in a group are likely to be more extreme than ratings of
members of the dominant group.24 People are more likely to notice the actions of
a token or solo and people have a more complex schema of their own group than
of other groups, which results in more moderate judgments of ingroup members.
As familiarity increases, one's awareness increases of the number and complexity
of evaluative dimensions along which individual group members may be
characterized. Consequently, one feels the need for more data before confidently
evaluating a member of her own group.25 The most recent studies of how
stereotypes operate in the human mind confirm the basic findings of the work on
which Professor Krieger's articles were based-people are often completely
21 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995)
[hereinafter Categories]; Perestroika, supra note 3.
22 Categories, supra note 21; Perestroika, supra note 3.
23 Categories, supra note 21, at 1177-209; see ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL CoGNITIoN 315-16
(2000) (explaining that from the perspective of social cognition theory, stereotypes are
cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a social group
and can color our interpretations of their behavior and traits).
24 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1287-88 (explaining that polarized evaluations of
distinctive members of an otherwise largely homogeneous group are common because people
pay particularly close attention to distinctive stimulus objects, such as a token women or
minority group member, and the poor perfonnance of a distinctive minority group member is
more likely to be remembered than the poor performance of a majority group member).
25 Categories, supra note 21, at 1193. The presence of relatively equal numbers of
members of different gender, racial, or ethnic categories within a social situation renders
category distinctions less salient. A category, explained Krieger, such as black, women or
Hispanic, will become increasingly differentiated as a perceiver gains more familiarity with its
constituents. Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1267 n.53; see Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 486 (2001)
(citing sources explaining that unique employees are at risk of being more harshly evaluated
than others).
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unaware of their use of stereotypes and behave in ways that are exactly contrary
to their asserted conscious beliefs.26 These studies also show how the threat that
they may be judged based on a stereotype and not on their performance can
negatively impact the performance of women and minorities.27
Thus, Kanter's focus on balancing the numbers of socially different kinds of
people in a workplace is supported by the most recent research. The implications
for affirmative action seem clear: Employers could reduce discrimination against
blacks in an organization by increasing their representation in the workforce. It
appears that racial stereotypes can be changed through exposure to numerous
examples of individuals who moderately disconfirm the group stereotype.28
However, a few examples may not suffice because people tend to respond to
individuals who do not confirm a strongly held stereotype by creating a subtype
rather than modifying the preexisting stereotype.29 Moreover, the research shows
that discrimination can persist in more balanced workforces. 30
26 See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1243 (2002).
27 See Laurie L. Cohen & Janet K. Swim, The Differential Impact of Gender Ratios on
Women and Men: Tokenism, Self-Confidence, and Expectations, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 876 (1995) (explaining that stereotype threat may cause women to avoid
certain jobs); Lord & Saenz, supra note 17 (showing that token status has a detrimental effect
on performance because the token's preoccupation with self-distinctiveness and self-
presentational strategies means the token pays less attention to the task to be performed);
Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613 (1997) (explaining how stereotype threat can depress
students' intellectual performances in educational settings); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 17
(discussing the implications for black law firm associates). Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver,
Stereotype Threat and Race of Interviewer Effects in a Survey on Political Knowledge (2002)
(paper presented at Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with
author) (finding support for stereotype threat hypothesis in experiment showing that black
respondents to a battery of questions about political knowledge get fewer answers right when
interviewed by a white interviewer than when interviewed by a black interviewer).
For a discussion of some of the special pressures on women and minorities to signal
conformity and therefore to work their identity to "fit in," see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259 (2000). In a subsequent work, the authors
suggest steps employers could take to ameliorate these pressures. See Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Economics of Race and Gender: Conversations at Work, 79 ORE. L. REV. 103
(2000).
28 See Blasi, supra note 26, at 1279; see also KUNDA, supra note 23, at 383, 390-91
(explaining that contact will most likely reduce stereotyping where it takes place between
individuals of equal status, where it is sufficiently extensive for the individuals to get to know
each other, and where the individuals share a common goal and actively cooperate).
29 See KUNDA, supra note 23, at 384-91; see also Blasi, supra note 26, at 1269. Kanter's
suggestion of batch hiring is responsive to this concern, but employers are rarely in a position to
fill a large number of vacant or newly created positions in the near term. KANTER, supra note 7,
at 222; see Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1276 (stating that rapid integration, which increases
opportunities for individuating interaction between members of socially different groups and a
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Relying on numbers-balancing alone would ignore other crucial research in
cognitive bias. Recall the basic insight: The culture makes race and gender
categories salient, and solo or token status in a workplace makes group
membership even more salient. 31 Dealing with the solo or token status problem
by making race- or sex-conscious employment decisions increases the salience of
race or gender. The increased salience of race or gender caused by their overt use
in decision making can trigger more racial or gender stereotyping. 32 For example,
using preferences may tend to exacerbate subtle forms of intergroup bias in the
evaluation of affirmative action beneficiaries if people assume those selected are
less qualified and less capable than others. 33 Susan Sturm has recently made the
related point that an employer making decisions with an eye toward racial
balancing alone will likely have to contend with claims of simple give-back
racism by members of the less favored group.34 The presence of blacks or women
in higher-level jobs is not inconsistent with the stereotype if their presence can be
explained away by preferential selection.35 Finally, some studies show that
preferences injure beneficiaries by creating or reinforcing an internal sense of
stigma and self-doubt and by creating disincentives to investment in human
capital.36
Thus, workplace integration and the opportunities it creates for interaction
between members of different groups is necessary to the elimination of intergroup
bias,3 7 but it is not sufficient, particularly if the process of integration makes
newly created sense of group identity can hardly be underestimated in its ability to eliminate
intergroup bias).
30 See supra note 17.
31 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1281 (noting that early in life one learns the stereotypes of
the major social groups in the United States, they are invoked automatically when a member of
the group is encountered, and they help make sense of incoming behavioral information,
particularly that which is consistent with the stereotype).
32 Id. at 1267. Cynthia Estlund has called this the potential "backfire effect" of
preferences. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 1, 89 (2000).
33 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1263-65.
34 Stun, supra note 25, at 539-42 (2001) (explaining that employers diversifying their
work forces must create the internal infrastructure to support and maintain productive conflict
resolution); see KANTER, supra note 7, at 316-36 (explaining that moving towards more
balanced work groups can create resistance, dissatisfaction, and tension); KUNDA, supra note
23, at 361-65 (explaining that people are especially likely to apply negative stereotypes to
individuals when they are motivated to affirm their self-worth).
35 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1269; cf McAdams, supra note 6, at 1082 (explaining that
raising the salience of race can make the urge to produce status through race discrimination
more powerful).
36 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1261-63; see also Jackson et al., supra note 7.
37 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1276.
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group membership more salient and otherwise heightens intergroup tensions.38
However, some of these "backfire effects" appear to be contextual. Where
employees understand that merit criteria predominate in decision making and that
race and gender are simply "plus" factors or tie-breakers, affirmative action
programs are more likely to be viewed as fair, resulting in less resentment by non-
beneficiaries and less self-doubt among beneficiaries. 39 Finding ways to promote
identification with the larger group and to foster intergroup cooperation are
especially important in minimizing potential backfire effects.40
Of equal importance is research suggesting that there are race- and sex-
neutral ways to help reduce intergroup bias, even in environments where blacks
and women are outnumbered.41 An employer taking these steps in addition to
increasing the representation of outgroup members in its workforce could
credibly assert that its actions would likely prevent some amount of workplace
discrimination against those employees.
For example, automatically activated stereotypes are less likely to influence
decisions in an environment where antidiscrimination and fairness norms
operate.42 Statements of company policy and workplace practices designed with
38 KANTER, supra note 7, at 279 (finding that the question is not simply whether to
integrate, but how women and minorities can be integrated with peers in empowering ways);
see also Henry Etkowitz et al., The Paradox of Critical Mass for Women in Science, ScI., Oct.
7, 1994, at 51 (attaining critical mass only partly resolved the dilemma of women in academic
departments); David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm
for Managing Diversity, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79 (explaining why many
diversity initiatives heighten racial tensions and hinder corporate performance).
3 9 BARBARA RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT 54-59
(1998) (emphasizing that employers should take steps to ensure that all understand
qualifications are the primary consideration in all job assignments and promotions);
Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1261-65, 1292 (discussing research showing that in some
circumstances if beneficiaries of preferences receive positive performance feedback and are told
that qualifications as well as group membership have been used in decision making, negative
effects on motivation, commitment, task selection, and group cooperation are reduced).
Transparency also forces institutions to bear more of the costs of adopting preferences, if there
are costs, instead of shifting them to third parties. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 90.
4 0 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1757, 1799-
801 (2003) (discussing strategies for managing workplace heterogeneity); Estlund, supra note
32, at 28-29; Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1270-76.
41 Blasi, supra note 26, at 1272 ("[A]Ii of us can resist relying on stereotypes in making
important decisions-under the right conditions."); Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1312-28
(explaining that the "ecology" of intergroup relations is important because intergroup bias
increases or decreases in response to contextual, environmental factors).
4 2 See KUNDA, supra note 22, at 366 (noting the presence of some evidence that people
pay more attention to individuating information about a stereotyped group member when the
information clashes with the stereotype and when they are motivated to see that person
accurately); see also Blasi, supra note 26, at 1276. Moreover, articulating antidiscrimination
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the explicit goal of assuring that all employees are treated fairly might reduce the
influence of stereotyping on employment decision making.4 3 Education and
training about the role of unconscious stereotyping in decision making may also
pay dividends, because being aware of the possibility of unconscious stereotyping
is another important factor in overcoming its influence. 44
Susan Sturm has studied companies that redesigned their systems of decision
making, work assignment, and conflict resolution to identify, address, and
minimize what she refers to as "second generation discrimination"-differential
outcomes produced by cognitive biases, structures of decision making, and
patterns of interaction.4 5 She found that successful systems integrated principles
of faimess and productivity into the process of making individual employment
decisions and conducting day-to-day operations.46
and fairness norms and incorporating them into workplace practices appears to be the most
effective way to ameliorate some of the backfire effects of race- or sex-conscious decision
making. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text.
43 Blasi, supra note 26, at 1277 (reporting that studies show merely hearing words like
"fairness" can cause people to behave as if they are committed to being fair).
44 See KUNDA, supra note 23, at 340-43; see also Blasi, supra note 26, at 1272
(explaining that prejudice-free responses are possible if people are aware of their biases,
motivated to change, and possess the cognitive resources to develop and practice correction
strategies); Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1286 (strong motivation, a great deal of capacity,
attention, and practice, and the application of deliberate, controlled, corrective processes are
necessary to prevent stereotypes and subtle ingroup priming valences from biasing
interpersonal judgment).
45 Sturm, supra note 25, at 491-520 (reporting results of study of practices at Deloitte &
Touche, Home Depot, and Intel). For a thorough treatment of the concept of "institutional
racism"--the notion that institutional norms and practices produce conduct that entrenches
racial hierarchy, even among those who genuinely do not intend to discriminate--see Ian F.
Haney Lrpez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
46 Sturm, supra note 25, at 519-22. The systems adopted at these companies to address
workplace bias employed gender- or race-neutral practices such as: (1) workshops to raise
awareness of gender dynamics; (2) internal dispute resolution; (3) requirements that a minimum
number of applicants be interviewed for a position; and (4) the use of uniform, structured,
interview questions. The systems also employed gender- or race-conscious practices such as:
(1) comparing gender utilization between offices and to benchmarks established by the firm; (2)
encouraging formation of women's management groups to allow women to identify issues and
network; (3) identifying overutilization or underutilization of men or women in a particular unit;
and (4) reviewing aggregate demographic data to locate and correct problems concerning the
inclusion of women, people of color, and older workers. Id at 494-519.
Another important example is the approach taken by MIT to address problems of gender
inequality identified in studies on the status of its women faculty. See Reports of the
Committees on the Status of Women Faculty, at http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports (2002). Steps
were taken to seek out women for influential positions and to increase the number of female
faculty members. Id In addition, the school looked for explicit evidence of disparate treatment,
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Similarly, several race- and sex-neutral practices that Linda Krieger has
suggested might reduce intergroup bias involve decision making in the context of
explicit fairness and antidiscrimination norms. For example, she suggests that
employers carefully specify evaluative criteria and provide decision makers with
a large amount of information on those criteria.47 Studies show that when asked
to make judgments about the characteristics associated with different classes of
people, individuals are less likely to draw unfounded, stereotype-consistent
associations "when they actually view, arrange, and make notes about the data
from which judgments are to be made."'48 Another fairness practice that may
prevent stereotyping from influencing decisions is requiring decision makers to
"consider the opposite;" i.e., to make the case for the option they are not selecting,
or to summarize the evidence tending to contradict their conclusions.49 These
approaches are also consistent with study results showing that people are less
likely to activate stereotypes during periods in which they are kept "cognitively
busy."50 Studies have found that "white evaluators were less likely to deliver
disproportionately harsh sanctions to black targets" when they believed that their
actions would be reviewed closely.51 Moreover, workplace practices consistent
with norms such as equal consideration, fair and equal access and participation,
professionalism, and respectful treatment can improve the workplace for all
employees, which is also likely to reduce any backfire effect of the use of
preferences. 52
One recent study of the impact of policies or procedures for dealing with
workplace sexual harassment concluded that both (1) "informational" methods,
such as distributing an anti-harassment policy, and (2) more "proactive" methods,
such as explicit complaint procedures and training programs, reduce workplace
such as disparities in compensation. Id. Finally, there is an ongoing attempt to understand and
solve the institutional nature of the problem by assessing the ways in which the criteria for
evaluation, timing expectations, and conventions of authorship, for example, might
disadvantage women over the course of a career. Id.
47 Categories, supra note 21, at 1246; see KUNDA, supra note 23, at 351 (noting that
stereotypes are less likely to affect impressions of an individual who is also known by
individuating information).
48 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1329 (finding that stereotypes and other forms of bias will
have less influence in the evaluation process when decision makers apply less generalized and
more specific, preferably objective, criteria).
49 Id. at 1329-30.
50 KUNDA, supra note 23, at 336-40, 359-61; Blasi, supra note 26, at 1250.
51 Categories, supra note 21, at 1246; see Sturm, supra note 25, at 519-22 (explaining
that successful antidiscrimination programs often included ways of making those responsible
account for results).
52 KANTER, supra note 7, at 266 (the problem of equality for women cannot be solved
without structures that potentially benefit all organization members more broadly); see also
Green, supra note 17, at 147 (noting the safeguards that appear to minimize the likelihood of
stereotyping).
1398 [Vol. 64:1385
2003] THE PREVENTIONJUSTIFICATIONFOR AFFIRMATIVEACTION 1399
sexual harassment, although proactive methods are much more effective. Women
in workplaces with proactive strategies are less likely to be physically threatened
or to be the targets of offensive sexual comments or questions. 53
While the research on identifying ways of evaluating the success of particular
interventions directed at minimizing bias is still fairly new,54 a growing body of
work suggests that employers could prevent some amount of discrimination in
their workplaces by (1) increasing the number of employees from members of
underrepresented groups through a selection process in which both qualifications
and group membership are factors, (2) and creating systems for the evaluation of
applicants and incumbents that would likely reduce the influence of stereotyping
on those evaluations. A close look at the Supreme Court's pronouncements in its
Title VII cases reveals room for such an holistic approach despite the statute's
express prohibition on race and sex discrimination.
53 Gruber, supra note 19, at 316 (describing how the study results are consistent with
earlier work suggesting that employee perceptions of organizational tolerance of sexual
harassment, their beliefs about leader's stances on the problem, or their concerns about
procedural justice rather than the mere objective existence of formal rules and regulations
strongly and routinely influence their attitudes and behaviors on matters of sex discrimination
and harassment).
54 Sturm, supra note 25, at 547, 567-68 (explaining that the evidence suggests companies
have made more progress developing structural approaches to promote gender rather than racial
equity); see Categories, supra note 21, at 1244-47 (explaining that although social cognition
theory suggests a prescriptive duty to identify and control for errors in social perception and
judgment, creating an affirmative duty on employers to prevent discrimination is not justified
because we do not "know enough about how to reduce cognition-based judgment errors to
enable us to translate such a duty into workable legal rules"); Gruber, supra note 19, at 316-17
(explaining that the processes through which an organization's methods of addressing sexual
harassment become sufficiently visible and credible have not been identified through research).
For contrasting views on the question whether the research in cognitive psychology
suggests firms could devise effective programs to curb unconscious bias compare Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1158 (1999) (concluding the research shows that
biases in judgment stemming from categorical generalizations cannot reliably be manipulated)
with Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233,
1239 (1999) ("[M]y sense is [that] the prospects of improvement by eradicating subtle
discrimination are greater than the likelihood that the efforts will fail."). Finally, for a critique of
discrimination prevention efforts that consist solely of training programs decoupled from day-
to-day organizational activity see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY I. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001).
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B. Doctrinal Foundations of The Prevention Justification
1. The Supreme Court Has Consistently Stated
That A Primary Purpose of Title VII is to
Encourage Employers to Take Steps
to Prevent Workplace Discrimination
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,55 its first decision interpreting the statute, a
unanimous Court established the disparate impact wing of Title VII
jurisprudence. The Court wrote that "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment
of Title VII... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. '56 Just four years later, in Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody,57 the Court, again unanimously, wrote that this was the "primary"
objective of Title VII, and it labeled that objective "prophylactic." 58 It held that
backpay should presumptively be awarded to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs
because a backpay award is needed to provide a spur or catalyst to self-
examination, self-evaluation, and elimination of the "last vestiges of an
unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history." 59 Backpay awards
are also consistent, said the Court, with the compensatory purpose of Title VII-
to make persons whole for injuries suffered because of employment
discrimination.60
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Court regularly referred to these twin
purposes of Title VII (prophylactic and compensatory) and emphasized the
importance of the prophylactic purpose. Occasionally, the Court referred to the
prophylactic purpose as primary and the compensatory purpose as secondary.
More often the Court did not rank the two purposes, but not once did any member
of the Court describe the compensatory purpose as more important than the
prophylactic purpose.61
55401 U.S. 424 (1971).
561d. at 429-30.
57 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
58 1d. at 417.
59 1d at 417-18.
60 1d at 418.
61 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that the "first" purpose of Title VII is to deter conduct harmful to society, and the
"second" is to make persons whole for injuries suffered); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 640 (1987) (stating that "[i]n evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan with
Title VIl's prohibition on discrimination, we must be mindful of 'this Court's and Congress'
consistent emphasis on the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law'
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The Court's emphasis on the importance of the prophylactic purpose actually
increased after the 1991 amendments to Title VII permitting plaintiffs to recover
compensatory and punitive damages. For example, in decisions in 1998 and 1999,
the Court relied on the prophylactic purpose of Title VII to fashion defenses
intended to encourage employers to take steps to prevent workplace
discrimination.
In Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth,62 the Court created an employer
affirmative defense to claims of supervisory sexual harassment in cases where the
supervisor has not taken a tangible employment action against the plaintiff.63 The
defense is comprised of two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise. 64 In a companion case, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,65 the Court
explained that it created the defense because the primary objective of Title VII is
"not to provide redress but to avoid harm.' 66 "It would... implement clear
statutory policy and complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring))
(internal quotations omitted)); Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986)
(stating that "Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving
the objectives of Title VII"); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (stating that
Title VII's primary goal is to end discrimination and not to promote lawsuits; the "fall back"
purpose is compensation); Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977)
(stating that a primary objective of Title VII is prophylactic-to achieve equal employment
opportunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male employees over
other employees-and an equally important purpose of the Act is to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating that "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were
selected as the preferred means for achieving [Title Vil's] goal"). But cf Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 787-88 & n.6 (1976) (Powell, J. and Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (objecting that the majority's holding that competitive seniority
should presumptively be granted to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs exalts the make-whole
purpose of Title VII above the primary purpose-to eradicate discrimination).
62 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
63 Id. at 761 (describing a tangible employment action as "a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits").64 Id. at 765 ("While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy
with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense.").
65 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
66 Id at 807. The Court in Ellerth also noted that the defense accommodated Title VII's
policy of "encouraging forethought by employers." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
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to recognize the employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty."
67
The next year, in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n,68 the Court concluded
that employers would not be liable for punitive damages for discriminatory
employment decisions of managerial agents where those decisions "are contrary
to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.' ",69 Otherwise,
Justice O'Connor explained, an employer might be dissuaded from
"implementing programs or policies to prevent discrimination in the workplace,
[which would be] directly contrary to the purposes underlying Title VII. The
statute's 'primary objective' is 'a prophylactic one'; it aims, chiefly, 'not to
provide redress but to avoid harm.' '"70 Justice O'Connor specifically
acknowledged the link to the Court's approach in Faragher and Ellerth and
explained that the purposes of Title VII would be advanced by encouraging
employers to create policies intended to prevent all forms of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII, not just sexual harassment. 71
67 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (f) (1997) (advising employers to
take all steps necessary to prevent workplace harassment)). Other EEOC regulations more
generally encourage employers to take voluntary steps to prevent future discrimination without
awaiting litigation and to act on a voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems
which constitute barriers to equal employment opportunity. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.1(b)(c) (2002).
Susan Sturm has concluded that the Court has imposed a legal obligation on employers to
take steps to minimize the likelihood that their decision making processes will produce bias.
Sturm, supra note 25, at 481, 489, 538, 542, 556 (exploring the possibility that Faragher,
Ellerth, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) represent the Court's
"structural" approach to workplace discrimination, in which the Court establishes a requirement
that an employer take steps to prevent workplace discrimination without superimposing
universal, formalistic solutions). For an assessment of the first seventy-two cases decided after
Faragher and Ellerth see David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your
"1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1265 (2001)
(concluding that the duty owed by employers did not change--that an employer exercises
reasonable care when it has a harassment policy that is disseminated to all employees and that
provides them an opportunity to report harassment to someone other than the harassing
supervisor).
68 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
69 Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
70 Id at 545 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)).
71 Id. Contrary to the findings of Sherwyn et al., supra note 67, with respect to the content
of the Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense, most courts have concluded that implementing
a written or formal antidiscrimination policy is not sufficient to insulate an employer from a
punitive damage award under Kolstad. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174
(9th Cir. 2002) (taking affirmative steps to respond to and remedy complaints of discrimination
is sufficient); Green v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2002) (same);
Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2002) (posting EEOC poster is not sufficient);
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2. The Supreme Court Has Recognized the Role that Token Status,
Conscious and Unconscious Stereotyping, and Subjective Decision
Making Play in Causing Employment Discrimination
Thus, we can see that the Court has spoken rather clearly for some time about
an issue of great importance for the doctrinal viability of a prevention justification
for affirmative action: Congress meant to encourage employers to take steps to
prevent discrimination in their workplaces. But that begs the question, "what does
the Court mean by discrimination?" Recent research, reviewed in Part II.A,
suggests the term should be understood to include the impact of token status,
unconscious stereotyping, and subjective decision making on minorities and
women. On one hand, the Justices seem to conceive of disparate treatment
discrimination as consisting of the intentional, conscious decisions of racists or
sexists to treat minorities and women less favorably because of their race or sex. 72
However, there are other strands in the Court's Title VII jurisprudence that
suggest the Court has a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the
nature of discrimination.
For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, a unanimous court held
that subjective or discretionary employment practices were subject to challenge
under the Title VII disparate impact theory. 73 At issue in Watson was the
common practice of making promotion decisions by relying on the subjective
judgments of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the
nature of the jobs to be filled.74 Insulating such subjective employment practices
from disparate impact analysis would be problematic, the Court explained,
because even assuming that disparate treatment analysis would adequately police
supervisors who exercised their discretion with discriminatory intent, "the
problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. 75
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,76 decided in the next term, the Justices were
split on the value of testimony offered to explain how and why stereotypes
operate. Ann Hopkins claimed that the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse
refused to consider her for a partnership because of her sex. Dr. Susan Fiske, a
social psychologist, offered testimony for Hopkins that the partnership selection
Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 857-60 (7th Cir. 2001) (formal policy is not
sufficient); Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 668-69 (1st Cir. 2000) (must make good
faith effort to comply).
72 Categories, supra note 21, at 1171-72; Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1298-302; Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Naturalizing Disparate Treatment Doctrine: Why So Little Progress in the
Courts? (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
73 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
74 Id. at 982.
75 Id at 990 (emphasis added).
76 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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process, which relied to a large extent on evaluations of candidates rendered by
the firm's partners, was likely influenced by sex stereotyping. As the plurality
explained, "[a]ccording to Fiske, Hopkins' uniqueness (as the only woman in the
pool of [88] candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely that
sharply critical remarks [from partners who knew her only slightly] ... were the
product of sex stereotyping .... ,,77 The district court relied in part on that
testimony in finding for Hopkins. 78
Because Price Waterhouse waived the objection at trial, the plurality rejected
the argument that the district court erred in relying on Fiske's testimony. But
Justice Brennan defended the district court's reliance on Fiske's testimony in a
more substantive way. He explained that he did not accept either the defendant's
characterization of the testimony as "unsubstantiated" and "intuitively divined" or
the dissent's "dismissive attitude toward Dr. Fiske's field of study and toward her
own professional integrity."'79 Despite the absence of a holding on the subject,
some lower courts have read Price Waterhouse as permitting expert testimony on
the role of token status and subjective decision making in stereotyping. 80
Surely even more ambiguously, in 2001 Justice Kennedy, who was quite
critical of Dr. Fiske's testimony in Price Waterhouse, joined with Justice
O'Connor to explain their understanding of the role that "instinct" may play in
employment discrimination. The Justices concurred in Board of Trustees of the
University ofAlabama v. Garrett, where the Court held that the 11 th Amendment
barred actions against states for money damages in federal court brought under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.81 In their concurrence Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor acknowledged the importance of the ADA as a force for
change in the treatment of persons with disabilities. They wrote:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or hostile
animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by simple want of
careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against
people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves.... [The law
77 Id. at 235-36.
7 8 Id at 236-37.
79 Id. at 255 (citations omitted). Indeed, Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia were
quite skeptical of Fiske's approach and conclusion. They criticized Fiske because she
"purported to discern stereotyping in comments that were gender neutral .. without any
knowledge of the comments' basis in reality and without having met the speaker or subject"
and insisted that the Court's opinions should not be read as requiring factfinders to credit
testimony based on this type of analysis." Id at 293 n.5 (referring derisively to Fiske's
characterization of the stereotyping as "unconscious").
80 See, e.g., Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D. Md. 1996); Jenson v.
Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 864 n.34 (D. Minn. 1993); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
81 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
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can and does give citizens] an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a
better understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting persons... into
the larger society. The law works this way because the law can be a teacher.
82
And finally, just last term in Grutter v. Bollinger,83 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
concurring, wrote that it was "well documented that... unconscious race
bias... remain[s] alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest values and
ideals."
84
Thus, it is a fair reading of the Court's relevant decisions that the purpose of
Title VII is to encourage employers to take steps to prevent discrimination in the
workplace, including discrimination that is the product of unconscious and
automatic bias and stereotyping. Moreover, the Court has created liability rules to
give employers incentives to take these steps. Under the Court's Title VII
affirmative action jurisprudence, employers are permitted to grant race or sex-
based preferences if they do so pursuant to a plan that is consistent with the
purposes of Title VII. An affirmative action plan intended to prevent workplace
discrimination would seem to satisfy this doctrinal requirement.
85
3. The Supreme Court's Title VII Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
The Court has decided only two cases presenting the question whether Title
VII permits an employer to make race- or sex-conscious employment decisions
pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action plan. In both United Steelworkers v.
Weber8 6 and Johnson v. Transportation Agency87 the Court determined the
employer's conduct was lawful.88 The plans were deemed lawful because
82 Id. at 374-75 (emphasis added).
83 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
84 Id at 2347-48.
85 According to several commentators, this approach would also be consistent with the
original understanding of voluntary affirmative action, which referred to measures intended to
prevent discrimination. See RESKIN, supra note 39, at 5-18 (defining affirmative action as
actions, policies and procedures designed to combat discrimination in the workplace by
replacing employment practices that are discriminatory with employment practices that
safeguard against discrimination); William W. Van Alstyne, Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L.
REV. 1517, 1527-30, 1564 n.9 (2000) (explaining that the use of the phrase in Executive Order
11246 required federal contractors to take "precautionary and preventive measures.., to
prevent discrimination... within the practices and policies of those benefiting from federal
contract work"); Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1255 n.1 1 (citing U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Statement on Affirmative Action (Report No. 54, 1977)).
86 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
87 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
88 Weber, 443 U.S. at 197; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620. I have previously discussed these
cases at length in the context of an exploration of their application to affirmative action plans
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(1) they were consistent with the purposes of Title VII, and (2) they operated
without causing undue harm to the rights of nonminority employees. Given that
encouraging employers to prevent discrimination is a primary purpose of Title
VII, an affirmative action plan intended to prevent workplace discrimination
would seem to satisfy the first requirement for a permissible affirmative action
plan set forth by the Court in Weber and Johnson.
In Weber, the Court approved an affirmative action plan that reserved 50% of
the openings in an in-plant craft-training program for black employees until the
percentage of black craftworkers in the plant approximated the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force. 89 Only 1.83% of the skilled crafiworkers at the
plant were black, and the work force in the area was approximately 39% black.90
The Court noted that the employer had for years hired as craftworkers only those
who had prior craft experience, knowing that blacks had long been excluded from
craft unions and could not get that experience. 91 The Court found that a plan
designed "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated
job categories"9 2 was permissible, so long as it did not "unnecessarily trammel
the interests of the white employees," 93 because the plan was consistent with one
goal Congress designed Title VII to achieve-breaking down old pattems of
racial segregation and hierarchy. 94
The Court in Johnson, explaining that it was "guided" by Weber, declared
lawful an affirmative action plan created by the employer to redress an
underrepresentation of women in its workforce.95 Pursuant to the plan the
employer promoted a female employee, in part because of her gender, rather than
a similarly qualified male employee. 96 The employer had created the affirmative
action plan in response to its finding that women constituted 36.4% of the
relevant labor pool but 22.4% of its work force, and there were no women among
the 238 employees in the job classification that covered the position to which the
female applicant was promoted.97 But there was no evidence, unlike Weber, that
seeking "diversity" in employment. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Whither Weber?, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 257 (1998).
89 Weber, 443 U.S. 193.
90 Id at 198-99.
91 Id at 198 & 198 n.1.
92 Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
93 Id. at 208 (explaining that the plan passed that test because: (1) it did not "require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees;" (2) it did not create
"an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees;" and (3) it was intended to eliminate
the existing racial imbalance and not maintain balance thereafter).
94 Id.
95 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641-42.
96 1d. at 619.
97 Id. at 620-21.
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the employer or a union with whom the employer contracted had been
intentionally discriminating against women.98
The Court nevertheless found the employer's conduct lawful because the
employer was animated by "concerns similar to those of the employer in
Weber."99 Considering the sex of the applicants for the position was justified by a
"'manifest imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of women in
'traditionally segregated job categories.' "100 The majority explained that this
"requirement... provides assurance... that sex... will be taken into account in
a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of
employment discrimination."' 10 1 Then, as in Weber, the Court concluded that the
plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees or create an
absolute bar to their advancement. 102
The Court in Weber stated that it was not "defin[ing] in detail the line of
demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans,"'10 3
and the majority in Johnson similarly did "not establish the permissible outer
limits of voluntary programs undertaken by employers to benefit disadvantaged
groups.' 104 In both cases the Court concluded the employer's conduct was
permissible because the purpose of the plans they had created "mirror[ed] those of
the statute."' 1 5 While the Court in Weber and Johnson found that one of those
purposes is eliminating the effects of workplace discrimination, 10 6 the primary
9 8 Justice O'Connor made this distinction explicit in her concurrence, when she explained
that in Weber, "[t]here was little doubt that the absence of black craftworkers was the result of
the exclusion of blacks from craft unions[,]" but that in Johnson "the evidence of past
discrimination is more complex" because although there were no women employed as skilled
craflworkers, the number of women with the qualifications for entry into the relevant job
classification was quite small. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 651-52 (O'Connor J., concurring).
99 Id. at 631.
100 Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
101 Id at 632.
102 Id at 637-39 (explaining that: (1) the plan required women to compete with all other
qualified applicants for promotion; (2) the plaintiff had no entitlement to the position he sought,
retained his own position, and remained eligible for other promotions; and (3) the plan was
intended to attain and not maintain a balanced work force).
103 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
104 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (characterizing Weber as
standing for the proposition that Title VII permits "voluntary employer action ... furthering
Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace").
106 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630. In his Johnson concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote that in
many cases an employer will find it more appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to
give preferences to members of underrepresented groups. Id. at 646-47 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court-Comment, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 96 (1986)
(explaining that an employer's appropriate "forward-looking considerations" might include,
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purpose of Title VII, as we have seen, is to encourage employers to prevent
discrimination in their workplaces.' 07 An affirmative action plan intended to
prevent discrimination would mirror that purpose of the statute.
III. TIE PREVENTION JUSTIFICATION IS EASIER TO RECONCILE WITH THE
PURPOSE OF TITLE VII THAN THE REMEDIAL AND DIVERSITY
JUSTIFICATIONS
This tight fit between the purpose of Title VII and an affirmative action
program to prevent discrimination is remarkable, given the difficulty reconciling
the purposes of Title VII with the affirmative action plans deemed lawful in
Weber and Johnson and the difficulty encountered by proponents of a diversity
justification for affirmative action in employment. Much of what I have to say
here is not entirely new, but these critiques of the remedial and diversity
justifications for affirmative action in employment offer a lens through which to
view the prevention justification, one that helps bring into even sharper focus its
apparent consistency with the purpose of Title VII.
A. Remedial Justifications for Affirmative Action in Employment
A reasonable person could, I think, read Weber as a case in which the Court
set forth the contours of a permissible "remedial" affirmative action plan and
Johnson as an application of Weber in a less explicitly remedial context.108
However, in Part II.B. I tried to show that the Court did not limit permissible
affirmative action plans under Title VII to those with a remedial purpose and that
an affirmative action plan intended to prevent discrimination would also be
consistent with the purpose of Title VII.
My point in this Part is different. Here I want to explain that it would be
problematic to read Weber and Johnson to privilege voluntary remedial
affirmative action in employment because the plans at issue in those cases were
only loosely remedial. In Weber and Johnson, the employers engaged in race- and
sex-conscious decision making in response to underrepresentation, respectively,
of blacks and women in their workforces. The Court found that both plans were
thus consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of
among others, improving the quality of the services it provides or increasing the diversity of its
workforce)).
107 See supra Part II.B. 1.
108 Some courts have held that the Court in Weber and Johnson meant to limit the Title
VII affirmative action exception to "remedial" plans. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d
1547, 1550, 1556 (3d Cir. 1996). I have explained elsewhere that there are several reasons a
court might come to that conclusion. See Yelnosky, supra note 88.
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discrimination, but neither plan fit comfortably within a paradigm of corrective
justice.
The focus in that paradigm is on the conduct of an identifiable wrongdoer. 10 9
By contrast, while the Court in Weber referred to the fact that the employer knew
that because of racial discrimination by the relevant union, hiring only
experienced skilled craft workers would result in an essentially all-white craft
workforce, the Court did not condition the legality of an employer's affimative
action plan on the employer's past discrimination.1 10 In Johnson, the Court did
not suggest that the employer was permitted to use gender as a factor in filling the
road dispatcher position because the employer had discriminated against women
in filling those positions in the past.
Even if the "manifest imbalance" required by the Court as a condition of
affirmative action in those cases could be seen as a reliable proxy for past
discrimination by the employer, I I permitting voluntary affirmative action as a
"remedy" for that discrimination allows the employer to avoid paying the penalty
for discrimination that would be imposed by Title VI. 112 The costs of remedying
any past discrimination are borne not by the employer, but by the currently
disfavored employee or applicant, who was certainly not a wrongdoer and likely
not a beneficiary of past employment discrimination. 113 Finally, the affirmative
action programs permitted in Weber and Johnson did not compensate past victims
of discrimination-at least not by design.14
10 9 See Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 865-66; see also Goodwin Liu, Affirmative
Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 381, 403 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination. Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 92 (1986).
110 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 633 n. 10 (stating that if the Court in Weber had been concerned
with past discrimination by the employer, it would have focused on discrimination in hiring
skilled, not unskilled workers, because only the scarcity of the former in the employer's work
force would have made it vulnerable to a Title VII suit--the relevant comparison would have
been between the percentage of black skilled workers in the employer's work force and the
percentage of black skilled craft workers in the area labor market).
111 But see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 n.8 (explaining that requiring an employer to show
that its discrimination created the manifest imbalance "would create a significant disincentive
for voluntary action"); see also Weber, 443 U.S. at 194-95.
112 Liu, supra note 109, at 402; Sullivan, supra note 109, at 94.
113 Brest & Oshige, supra note 6, at 866; Liu, supra note 109, at 402; Sullivan, supra note
109, at 94.
114 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the Kaiser
program permitted the employer to avoid identifying victims of past discrimination); Brest &
Oshige, supra note 6, at 866 (summarizing the three ways in which voluntary remedial
affirmative action often departs from the paradigm of corrective justice); Liu, supra note 109, at
402 n. 110 (stating that the beneficiary of a remedial affirmative action program need not be an
actual victim of discrimination); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991)
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Judge Posner, focusing on these features of voluntary "remedial" affirmative
action programs in employment, concluded that it would not be logical for the
goal of remedying past discrimination to have priority over other legitimate goals
a racial preference might serve. 115 While I agree with Justice Blackmun's
analysis that the Weber Court's approach was a practical and equitable response
to the problem of work force segregation, 116 it is not the only such approach, and
the steps authorized by Weber and Johnson seem awkward if they are viewed as
"compensatory" or "remedial."1 1 7
(explaining that compensatory justice in this context requires something impossible-
determining the extent to which individual members of minority groups have been injured by
past wrongs); Sullivan, supra note 109 at 95-96 (explaining that the Court is not being faithful
to a remedial paradigm in its affirmative action cases, but is engaging instead in a utilitarian
balancing of hardships).
115 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a state actor could,
consistent with the equal protection clause, prefer a black applicant for a position as drill
sergeant in a penal boot camp based on expert opinion that black inmates would more likely be
rehabilitated than if a white man was in the position). I agree with Judge Posner's basic point
about remedial affirmative action programs in employment, and thus, I disagree with Cynthia
Estlund that many of the objections to affirmative action have little force against affirmative
action plans that are remedial in nature, Estlund, supra note 32, at 93-94, if she has in mind the
kind of plan deemed lawful in Johnson.
116 Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117 Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars have shown how the Supreme Court's equal protection
cases can be read to permit the government to use affirmative action in procurement to remedy
the effects of private discrimination it has not caused. See Ian Ayres & Fredrick Vars, When
Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1577,
1611 (1998) (exploring the ramifications of the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) that the government "has the
authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative
jurisdiction").
They further assert that upon a showing that both the government and private firms
compete for a certain group of employees, the government should be able to favor minority
employees to counteract the effects of private hiring discrimination. Id at 1635. They
hypothesize that where there is discrimination in the relevant private employment market, the
beneficiaries of a government affirmative action program in the same market were likely
victims of that private discrimination, and the disfavored applicants for government jobs are
advantaged unjustly in their job search in the private market. Id at 1635-38.
This remedial approach to affirmative action in the employment context is not entirely
satisfying because there is no way of knowing whether any particular individual was a victim
or beneficiary of discrimination in the private employment market. It may be easier to tolerate
this loose fit in the procurement context where it is more likely that any particular firm among a
relative few operating in a discriminatory market will have been benefited or harmed in some
way at some point by discrimination in that market. In a labor market, by contrast, where a
larger number of participants interact with a larger number of employers, assuming
discrimination operates against or in favor of all market participaimts is less reasonable.
Moreover, this approach to affirmative action in employment may justify only government
affirmative action. Private employers, by contrast, have no resonant authority to remedy the
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B. Diversity Justifications for Affirmative Action
The most popular iteration of the diversity justification for affirmative action
in employment is based on the assertion that there are competitive or operational
advantages to increasing the numbers of women and minorities in a relatively
homogenous work force. For some employers it is almost an axiom that "our
diversity is our strength." 1 8 The operating assumption tends to be that racial,
ethnic, and gender diversity is a proxy for a diversity of opinions, experiences,
ideas, and beliefs that can contribute to enhanced workplace performance. 119
This justification for race- or sex-based preferences faces special and perhaps
insurmountable doctrinal obstacles. In Title VII, Congress specifically determined
that race discrimination in employment was unlawful even if an employer could
show that discrimination furthered its operational goals, such as producing better
products or providing better services to its customers. Under section 703(e)(1), an
employer can engage in intentional discrimination "on the basis of... religion,
discrimination of other private employers. That a government employer might have more
leeway to engage in affirmative action than a private employer might explain the difference in
the Court's approaches in Weber and Johnson. In the latter case, which involved a public
employer, there was less justification for the Court to conclude that the employer itself had
previously discriminated. However, Weber might be read as consistent with an argument that
the approach suggested by Ayres and Vars need not be limited to public employers. In Weber,
recall, a private employer was arguably permitted to engage in affirmative action to remedy
discrimination by another private actor in the same labor market-the union.
118 Ann C. McGinley & Michael J. Yelnosky, Board of Education v. Taxman: The
Unpublished Opinions, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REv. 205, 206 (1998). For example, IBM's
vice-president of global work force diversity once explained that the company's view of
increasing job opportunities for women and minorities is based not on a "moral imperative," but
rather a "strategic imperative" because diversity is inextricably linked to the success of the
business. Id. at 206-07.
119 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 32, at 83. There are, however, several distinct
justifications that are or could be labeled "diversity" justifications for affirmative action in
employment. For example, in Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997), where a school district reducing force retained one of two
similarly situated teachers because she was black and her counterpart was white, several
"diversity" arguments were made in support of the decision. The school board argued that a
more racially diverse teacher work force: (1) reduced the risk that teachers or administrators
would discriminate against minority students; (2) promoted understanding and tolerance among
students, see Whither Weber?, supra note 88, at 277, and; (3) promoted a more enriching
educational environment for students. Ann C. McGinley, Affirmative Action Awash in
Confusion: Backward-Looking-Future-Oriented Justifications for Race-Conscious Measures, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 209, 241 (1998).
Of course, the Supreme Court recently ruled that student body diversity and the
educational benefits it brings are a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003). One of the important
questions unanswered by Grutter is whether its reasoning would permit the use of affirmative
action in faculty hiring.
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sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.' 120 The omission of
race from this bona fide occupational qualification defense (BFOQ) was
intentional. 12 1
Even assuming that there is an implied "necessity exception" to the exclusion
of race as a possible BFOQ, as some have suggested, 122 or instead that an
employer seeks to justify a gender, rather than a race-based employment decision
on the ground that it improves operations, the BFOQ is "written narrowly, and
th[e] Court has read it narrowly."' 123 An employer would be required under the
Court's precedents to show, for example, that being a woman would "affect an
employee's ability to do the job,"'124 and under the cases interpreting Title VII,
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2000) (emphasis added).
121 See Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Kingsley R.
Browne, Nonremedial Justifications for Affirmative Action in Employment: A Critique of the
Justice Department Position, 12 LAB. LAW. 451, 467 (1997); Deborah C. Malamud, Values,
Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1708 (1997)
("Title VII ... made... [an] explicitly colorblind stand against race as a bona fide occupational
qualification ... .") (reviewing K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUS:
THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE (1996); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY JR., NOT ALL BLACK &
WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES (1996); RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); and JOHN
DAVID SKRETNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (1996)).
The inclusion of sex in the BFOQ and the exclusion of race might give employers more
freedom to take affirmative steps to favor women than blacks. This aspect of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence was criticized by Justice Stevens in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), where the Court held that all government race-based preferences
were subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Stevens wrote that using strict scrutiny to test the legality
of benign race-based classifications and intermediate-level scrutiny for sex-based classifications
might give governments more freedom to favor women than racial minorities. Id at 247
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 See, e.g, MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 284 (1988).
123 Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
124 Id. That the Court did not refer to the BFOQ defense in Weber or Johnson is not proof
that it is irrelevant to the lawfulness of affirmative action plans under Title VII. In neither case
did the employer seek to justify its use of race or gender on operational grounds. The BFOQ
defense most obviously applies where the employer's justification is operational-where the
employer contends that selecting employees based on gender, for example, is "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(emphasis added).
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customer or co-worker preference for a woman would not ordinarily be a
justification for discrimination otherwise prohibited by the statute. 125
But the standard diversity justification is about more than customer or co-
worker preference for employees of a particular race or sex;126 it is based on the
assertion that demographic diversity will improve the employer's products or
services. However, "a utilitarian justification lends itself to a utilitarian
critique,"' 127 and many "employers would be hard-pressed-if pressed beyond
platitudes-to demonstrate the instrumental benefits of [demographic] diversity
within their operations."'128 To the contrary, demographic homogeneity may be
more operationally efficient, particularly to the extent that a job requires the
125 See Malamud, supra note 121, at 1708; Strauss, supra note 114, at 1623. I say "not
ordinarily" because the Court has not ruled out the possibility of endorsing a privacy-based
BFOQ. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206 n.4.
126 However, one popular version of the diversity justification would implicate the general
prohibition on customer preference as a defense to otherwise unlawful discrimination. For
example, a firm might argue that demographic diversity in sales and marketing positions might
legitimize a firm's products or services with a heterogeneous client base. See, e.g., Malamud,
supra note 1, at 954.
127 Malamud, supra note 121, at 1709.
128 Estlund, supra note 32, at 83-84. For example, in jobs where technical skills or
physical ability are most important, the connection between demographic diversity and
improved performance may not be demonstrable. Even where the connection may be
demonstrated-there is evidence, for example, that diverse work groups may generate a
broader range of ideas and alternatives-demographic diversity is also associated with friction,
absenteeism, turnover, dissatisfaction, reduced commitment to the job, and lower productivity.
Id at 84, see also KANTER, supra note 7, at 222 (explaining that people with incongruent status,
like women in male jobs, strain group interaction by generating ambiguity and lack of social
certitude); Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 17, at 596-97 (contrasting the diversity justification in
the context of companies that sell consumer products with the same justification asserted by a
law firm). But see Linda Barrington & Kenneth Troske, Workforce Diversity and Productivity:
An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data (July, 2001) (concluding that in a study of
firms diversity was either positively correlated with productivity or there was no significant
relationship between diversity and productivity). See generally Orlando C. Richard et al., The
Impact of Visible Diversity on Organizational Effectiveness: Disclosing the Contents in
Pandora's Box, 8 J. Bus. & MGMT. 1 (2002).
In Grutter, the Supreme Court found that the Michigan Law School had a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body, but the Court explained that it gave special
deference to the law school's judgment because "given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003). Of course, no such deference is due American
business under Title VII. However, it is worth noting that the Court concluded that the
educational benefits that the Law School sought through racial diversity in the class were "not
theoretical but real" because major American businesses filed an amicus brief in which they
asserted that the skills needed in today's global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Id. at 2340.
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exercise of personal discretion, because the firm may choose to rely on the trust
that comes from "'homosocial reproduction'-selection of incumbents on the
basis of social similarity."' 129 It would be difficult to read Title VII to permit
employers to make race-conscious employment decisions to further operational
goals only when those goals can be attained by "diversifying" rather than
"homogenizing" the work force. 130
Even if an employer could show that there are operational benefits to
assembling a group of workers with different opinions, experiences, ideas, and
beliefs, it would have to show that racial or gender diversity is an accurate proxy
for the desired viewpoint diversity. However, "[t]he more individualized the
employment decision, the more possible and sensible it may seem to make
individualized inquiries into the actual experiences and attitudes of the
applicant."' 131 In the framework of the Court's BFOQ doctrine, an employer
would have to show not only that diversity of opinions, ideas, beliefs, or attitudes
among the members of the work force relates to the "essence" or the "central
mission of the employer's business,"' 132 but also that (1) the employer had a
"factual basis" for believing that all or substantially all women or blacks, for
example, had certain opinions, ideas, beliefs, or attitudes not sufficiently
represented in the current work force complement, or (2) that it was "impossible
or highly impractical to deal with the.., employees on an individualized
basis."'133 Absent this showing, a diversity-based affirmative action program
would not likely survive Title VII scrutiny and would instead appear to be no
more than the use (perhaps well-intentioned) of a stereotype about the relationship
between gender or race and certain attitudes, which Congress meant in Title VII
to make unlawful when used as the basis for making employment decisions. 134
129 KANTER, supra note 7, at 54; see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Homogeneity
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring the ways in which managers,
seeking to produce trust, fairness, and loyalty in the workplace will have a tendency to organize
homogeneous work teams); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 40, at 1795-97 (same); Estlund,
supra note 31, at 27-28, 83-84.
130 See Malamud, supra note 1, at 964. Professor Malamud has also pointed out that the
utilitarian quality of the diversity justification might justify limiting the employment
opportunities of blacks, for example, to those that involve serving an African-American
customer base. Id. at 962 (distinguishing between black social workers and black physicists).
See also Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11 th Cir. 1999); Patrolmen's Benevolent
Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Whither Weber?, supra note
88, at 280 (mock opinion for the Court affirming the Third Circuit in Taxman).
131 Estlund, supra note 32, at 83.
132 Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991).
133 See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,412-17 (1985).
134 See Estlund, supra note 32, at 83 n.347 (explaining that this is "just the sort of
stereotyping that undermines ... understanding and communication"); Perestroika, supra note
3, at 1267 (explaining that diversity claims tend to reinforce the essentialism inherent in an
undifferentiated monolithic category).
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C. Estlund's "Integration Justification "for Affirmative Action
I would be remiss if I did not discuss in some detail Cynthia Estlund's
"integration justification" for affirmative action 1 35 Exploring its relationship to
my prevention justification as well as explaining why I have concluded that her
approach is less consistent with Title VII's purposes and doctrine helps further
etch the contours of my argument.
Professor Estlund's views on the subject of affirmative action in employment
are part of a larger project in which she makes the case for recognizing the
workplace as an institution in which ties that are necessary to sustain a diverse
democratic society can form across lines of racial and ethnic identity. Her
integration thesis would support "efforts to bring about more-than-token minority
[or female] representation in workplaces that are overwhelmingly white [or
male]."'1 36 She distinguishes her integration justification from the diversity
justification on the ground that the integration argument is based not on
differences between members of different racial groups and the relevance of those
differences to enhancement of an employer's products or services, but on
commonality and connectedness-on cultivating empathy, understanding, and
friendship among citizens on opposite sides of our society's racial and ethnic
divides. 137
Estlund thus argues that selecting employees based on group membership is
justifiable because group membership is not used as a proxy for relevant
difference but because "group membership itself often triggers stereotypes, bias,
aversion, and suspicion, and has often been the basis for segregation and
discrimination."' 138 In pointing out the role that workplace integration could play
in breaking down stereotypes, Professor Estlund hints at, but does not develop,
what I am now referring to as the prevention justification for affirmative action.
She has a more ambitious claim about the benefits of workplace integration: She
claims that workplace integration will lead to a healthier democracy. 139 My
claim, by contrast, is that it would help reduce workplace discrimination.
Estlund's integration argument is based on diffuse benefits that accrue to the
society as a whole in the form of a healthier, more functional democracy. 140 As
she acknowledges, these benefits are difficult to demonstrate and government
135 See Estlund, supra note 32, at 78-94.
13 6 Id. at 79 n.333.
137 Id. at 81-84.
138 Id. at 83. Group membership is similarly relevant under my prevention justification
without the use of that membership as a proxy for certain attitudinal characteristics of group
members.
13 9 See Estlund, supra note 32, at 77 (noting that individuals working together in relatively
heterogeneous workplaces form ties that help "to sustain a diverse democratic society").
14 0 Id. at 84-86.
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rather than private employers are in a better position to assert an interest in
pursuing them.14 1 To be fair, the benefits claimed by the prevention justification
will also be quite difficult to measure, but employer steps to prevent
discrimination in the workplace were specifically encouraged by Congress in
Title VII, and the Court has, as we have seen, read the statute with that goal in
mind. Private and government employers alike are well situated to assert an
interest in obtaining those benefits. Thus, the prevention justification fares better
than the integration justification in light of the existing statutory framework in
which America's employers operate. 142
While the claims I make in support of the prevention justification are most
consistent with the purposes of Title VII, the fit between the prevention
justification and Title VII affirmative action doctrine is not seamless. It is to these
special doctrinal challenges that I now turn.
IV. "STRETCHING" EXISTING DOCTRINE
To this point, I have tried to show that an employer could prevent some
workplace discrimination against blacks and women by implementing a program
pursuant to which it, in part, took race and sex into account to increase the
representation of blacks and women in the work force. I have shown that the
Supreme Court's Title VII cases leave room for such an approach because the
primary purpose of Title VII as articulated by the Court is to encourage
employers to take steps to prevent workplace discrimination, and one requirement
of a lawful affirmative action plan under Title VII is that it be consistent with the
141 Id. at 86, 92-93. I suggest, supra note 117, that the remedial justification for
affirmative action offered by Ayres and Vars is similarly limited to government employers.
142 If Professor Estlund is correct about the role of the workplace in a diverse democracy,
as I believe she is, some of the benefits of integration she describes would flow from the use of
discrimination prevention programs like the ones I contemplate here, but the benefits would be
a side effect of the efforts aimed at preventing workplace discrimination.
While, on the one hand, Estlund's justification for affirmative action is more ambitious
than the prevention justification, she does not advocate a change in current judicial
interpretation of what Title VII permits in the way of affirmative action. She concludes that an
employer could pursue the benefits of integration that she describes in the face of the manifest
imbalance required by Weber and Johnson, and that the other limits imposed by those cases are
consistent with her thesis because they mark, in some way, the boundary between preferences
that are consistent with constructive interaction within the workforce and those that are too large
or rigid. She ultimately concludes that the integration argument may operate most sensibly one
step removed from legal doctrine. See Estlund, supra note 32, at 88-93; see also Whither
Weber?, supra note 88, at 281 (mock opinion for the Court in Taxman suggesting that the
existence of a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category might serve as a
justification for a diversity-based affirmative action program under Weber and Johnson).
For an argument similar to Estlund's see Anderson, supra note 17, at 1198-99 (developing
an "integration rationale for affirmative action" based on equal opportunity and a democratic
civil society).
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purposes of Title VII. Before moving to discuss how such a plan could satisfy the
second requirement of a lawful affirmative action plan under Title VII, more
needs to be said about the "proper purpose" requirement because the doctrinal
manifestations of that requirement are not without complication.
A. Measuring the Existence of a Manifest Imbalance Reflecting
Underrepresentation of Blacks or Women in a Traditionally Segregated
Job Category
I have shown that Weber and Johnson require that an affirmative action plan
further a purpose of Title VII, and that preventing discrimination is perhaps the
preeminent purpose of the statute. However, in both cases, the test used by the
Court to determine whether the employer was acting in a manner consistent with
a proper purpose of Title VII might suggest discrimination prevention is not a
permissible purpose of an affirmative action program. In Weber, the Court posed
the question before it as whether employers were free under Title VII to take
"race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories."'1 43 In Johnson, the Court similarly asked whether the
employer's affirmative action plan "was justified by the existence of a 'manifest
imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of women in 'traditionally
segregated job categories. '144
The implications of this requirement for an affirmative action plan intended
to prevent discrimination are unclear. The requirement may not apply to
prevention plans. As discussed in Part II.B.3, Weber and Johnson arguably
involved plans aimed at ameliorating the effects of discrimination-effects that
were reflected in the underrepresentation of blacks or women in the employer's
workforce. Indeed, the Court in Johnson made an explicit connection between
the manifest imbalance test and plans with a remedial purpose when it wrote,
"[t]he requirement that the 'manifest imbalance' relate to a 'traditionally
segregated job category' provides assurance... that sex or race will be taken into
account in a manner consistent with Title VHI's purpose of eliminating the effects
of employment discrimination." 145
That connection is also apparent from the Court's description of how the
requisite imbalance is to be identified:
In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking sex or race
into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the
employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or general
population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special
143 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
144 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1986).
145 Id. at 632.
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expertise .... Where a job requires special training, however, the comparison
should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant
qualifications. 146
The Court cited both Teamsters147 and Hazelwood 48 in support of this approach,
cases in which the Court set forth the requirements of a prima facie case of a
pattern and practice of discrimination, despite the Johnson Court's statement that
a prima facie showing of discrimination was not required. 149
Thus, one might conclude that when an employer seeks to justify an
affirmative action plan on the grounds that it is intended to remedy past
discrimination, the Court requires that there be evidence the employer has
discriminated in the form of an underrepresentation of women in the workforce,
as measured against their representation in the relevant labor pool. When
engaging in affirmative action to prevent future discrimination against women, on
the other hand, the employer might instead be required to show an imbalance in
the gender make-up of the workforce, regardless of the percentage of women in
the relevant labor market. The focus would then shift to the presence of small
numbers of women in the jobs in question, which would put them at special risk
for discrimination. There would be other evidence of the employer's bona fides in
the form of the race- or sex-neutral prevention measures I have advocated must be
part of an affirmative action prevention program.
In some cases, this distinction would be unimportant. In Johnson, for
example, the employer justified its decision to prefer a woman for a promotion to
a skilled craft position over a similarly qualified male on the ground that none of
its 238 skilled craft workers were female, although women constituted 36.4% of
the area labor pool. 150 The Court found that the employer was justified in
considering as one factor the sex of the applicants for the position in question
because of "the obvious imbalance in the Skilled Craft category."'151 A prevention
program would have been justified under this approach as well, but without
reference to the proportion of women in the relevant labor pool. The focus would
be on the risk that a lone female employee or small group of female employees in
the Skilled Craft category would be harmed by the operation of stereotypes and
the other pressures of token status. Thus, as in Johnson, in workplaces where
women or minorities are at special risk because of their relatively small numbers,
146 Id. at 631-32 (citations omitted).
147 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
148 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
149 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 ("A manifest imbalance need not be such that it would
support a prima facie case against the employer .....
150 Id. at 621.
151 Id. at 637.
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they might also be underrepresented when compared to their presence in the
relevant labor pool.
However, there would be cases where the precise way in which the requisite
imbalance was measured would matter. In that important set of cases, my point is
that existing doctrine might not need substantial modification to make room for
the prevention justification. To review, research suggests that women and blacks
are at particular risk for discrimination when they are present in a workforce in
numbers below 15%, and the effects of token status dissipate as their numbers
increase. 152 Consider the implications for law firm hiring of associates. A law
firm with fifty associates might be concerned about the effects of token status on
its three black associates and consider (1) taking race-conscious steps to bring
more black lawyers into the firm, and (2) making race-neutral changes in the way
it recruits, trains, and evaluates associates. The firm's use of a racial preference in
hiring as part of this plan would be vulnerable to a Title VII challenge on the
ground that because blacks constitute about 6% of recent law school graduates
they are not underrepresented at the firm, notwithstanding the risk posed to the
black associates because of the racial imbalance in the firm's associate ranks. 153
The doctrinal move to accommodate the use of affirmative action here is not
radical. Instead of focusing on work force underrepresentation as measured by
comparison to the racial composition of the relevant labor pool-6% black; 6%
black-the focus would be on imbalance as measured by the racial composition
of the associate work force--6% black; 94% white.
B. An Affirmative Action Plan Intended to Prevent Workplace
Discrimination Need Not "Unnecessarily Trammel" the Rights of
Applicants or Employees Not Benefiting from the Plan
Finally, under Weber and Johnson, an affirmative action plan must not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of employees or applicants who do not benefit
from the operation of the plan.154 This "trammel" analysis includes a cluster of
requirements, most of which could be satisfied easily by an employer
implementing an affirmative action prevention program, and many of which are
not just required by the governing doctrine, but suggested by the research
supporting the justification. However, one of those requirements deserves special
attention.
152 See supra Part ll.A.
153 Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 17, at 545; see JOHN J. DONOHUE In, FOUNDATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT DlSCRIMNATON LAW 363 n.4 (1997) (raising the question whether employment
discrimination law should encourage proportional representation of blacks in all firms or
"bunching" of blacks in some firms to help consolidate their power).
154 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38.
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The Court concluded in both Weber and Johnson that the plans did not
unnecessarily trammel the rights of whites and men because the plans were
designed to attain a more balanced work force and not thereafter to maintain that
balance. 155 In Weber, the plan was scheduled to end "as soon as the percentage of
black skilled craftworkers in the.., plant approximate[d] the percentage of blacks
in the.. .labor force." 156 In Johnson, the employer had not yet identified a long-
term goal for representation of women in skilled craft positions, but the goal was
to be based on their representation in the relevant labor pool, which satisfied the
Court that the employer's objective was not to "maintain a permanent... sexual
balance." 157
An employer implementing an affirmative action plan to prevent
discrimination would have a less determinate target goal to attain-something
greater than 15% of the segment of the work force in question, but not a number
that can be set with precision. 158 On one hand, a 35% target, which Kanter
suggested was the "tipping point" toward more balanced representation, could be
viewed as consistent with existing doctrine. The 35% target is fairly precise, and
once achieved can be abandoned, consistent with the purpose of the program.' 5
9
155 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 ("[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to
maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance."); Johnson, 480
U.S. at 639 ("The Agency's plan was intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain
one.").
156 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
157 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640.
158 Kanter suggested the "tipping point" towards more balanced representation is 35%,
but that precise number has not been supported by solid research, although there is some
support for it in at least one study. Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 555 n.12. Martha Chamallas
has reviewed the literature and concluded that 25% is most often cited as the point at which a
group goes beyond token representation to achieve a critical mass. Chamallas, supra note 20, at
324. Thus, it appears that the question of precisely how many of a category are enough to
change a person's status from token is unanswered by the substantial literature spawned by
Kanter's theory. See Jackson et al., supra note 7, at 554 n. 1.
159 The assumption would be that once a workplace is sufficiently integrated, subsequent
resegregation, if not extreme, would not warrant conscious racial or gender reintegration. See
Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative
Stereotypes?, 83 AM. EcoN. REV. 1220 (1993) (concluding that there is some evidence that
affirmative action programs intended to break down stereotypes could be temporary); cf
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639 (in concluding that the employer's plan was temporary, the Court
noted that the Agency's director testified that "while the 'broader goal' of affirmative action,
defined as 'the desire to hire, to promote, to give opportunity and training on an equitable, non-
discriminatory basis,' is something that is 'a permanent part' of 'the Agency's operating
philosophy,' the broader goal 'is divorced, if you will, from specific numbers or percentages')
(citation omitted); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1745, 1754 (1996) ("as ... affirmative action achieves its long-run effect of healing racial
separation... race will gradually become irrelevant and-like eye color or blood type-will
cease to be significant for university admissions"); Malamud, supra note 1, at 966
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Both Weber and Johnson offer strikingly strong support for a target goal of 35%.
In Weber, the employer's target for black hiring was 39%, and the employer was
starting with a work force that was less than 2% black.' 60 In Johnson, the goal,
which was subject to revision, was 36.4%, and there was not one woman in a
skilled craft position. 161
On the other hand, the Court made it clear that there are limits to its patience
on this matter. An affirmative action plan "that can be equated with a permanent
plan of 'proportionate representation by race and sex,' would violate Title
VII."'1 62 Moreover, if the preferences are too great in the sense that the employer's
targets far exceed the proportion of blacks in the relevant labor pool, for example,
there is evidence that affirmative action might create disincentives among blacks
to invest in improving their kills.163 Finally, it might take a long time for an
employer to achieve its stated goal under a discrimination-prevention affirmative
action program. 164
However, not only were the remedial targets permitted in Weber and Johnson
high, and the affirmative action plans deemed lawful by the Court therefore likely
to last for a substantial period, those targets were themselves fairly arbitrary, at
least in the sense that they were based on debatable conclusions about the
demographics of the relevant labor pool and assumptions about what a workplace
would look like absent discrimination.165 That it might take a long time for the
employer to achieve its stated goal was not troubling to the Court in Johnson, for
example, given that it concluded the plan was a moderate one that visited only
minimal intrusion on the legitimate expectations of other employees. 166
(distinguishing indeterminacy of diversity rationale from a rationale that identifies a social
problem that affirmative action can help cure and therefore suggests its stopping point, for
example, when inequality between blacks and whites caused by societal discrimination has
ended); Ayres & Vars, supra note 117, at 1638 n.216 (a program would be temporary if it
lasted only as long as the effects it seeks to counteract, or to demonstrate to employers the
viability of nondiscriminatory employment practices, or if it had a fixed end date or provision
for regular review).
160 Weber, 443 U.S. at 210.
161 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
162 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163 Coate & Loury, supra note 159, at 1221.
164 Because women constitute a much larger percentage of the labor force than blacks,
discrimination prevention programs based on attaining a critical mass of women may reach
their goal much sooner than programs aimed at hiring or promoting a critical mass of black
employees.
165 See Liu, supra note 109, at 427-28 (noting that the remedial stopping point is based on
achieving some distribution that would exist absent discrimination, which cannot be quantified
with any specificity); Schuck, supra note 6, at 21-22.
166 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639-40, 640 n. 16 (explaining that it is not surprising that the plan
had no explicit end date, because the employer anticipated only gradual increases in the
representation of women, due in part to "the low turnover that exists in these positions and the
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger167 may be
instructive here. The Court found that the University of Michigan Law School's
use of racial preferences in admissions was narrowly tailored to achieve its goal
of seeking a diverse student body by enrolling in each class a "critical mass" of
underrepresented minority students. 168 The Court refused to exempt race-
conscious admissions programs from the requirement that the government's use
of race must have a logical end-point. However, at least in the context of higher
education, the Court seems comfortable with sunset provisions or periodic
reviews to determine whether preferences are still necessary. 169
Consider once again our hypothetical law firm. Assume that the firm decides
that the best way to prevent discrimination against its three black associates would
be to implement a race-neutral discrimination prevention plan and to increase the
number of black associates (now three of fifty) through the use of racial
preferences in hiring. Further assume that in the next ten years the firm plans to
double in size-increasing the number of associates from fifty to one-hundred.
The prevention justification would, I am suggesting, permit the firm to use racial
preferences in pursuit of the goal of hiring approximately twenty-five black
associates in that ten-year period, or 50% of its new associates, thereby increasing
the percentage of black associates from 6% to 31%.
Under Weber and Johnson, the devil would then be in the remaining details,
and it appears likely that the firm could try to achieve this goal consistent with
existing doctrinal requirements. A plan that does not trammel the rights of
employees or applicants who are not its intended beneficiaries has the following
additional characteristics: It does not require the discharge of any employee or
otherwise unsettle some legitimate, firmly rooted expectation in a job, either at the
hiring or promotion stage; and it sets aside no specific number of positions for
members of one race or sex-race or sex is simply one factor to be considered
among others in a competitive assessment of the fitness of applicants for a
particular position covered by the plan.170 Thus, the firm could lawfully make
race a factor when considering applicants for associates' positions along with the
other factors the firm considers when making hiring decisions, such as
performance in on-campus and workplace interviews, quality of law school
attended, class rank, law review membership, performance in a summer program,
small numbers of persons who can be expected to compete for available openings") (citation
omitted).
167 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
168 Id. at 2342-43.
169 Id. at 2346.
170 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at
2342-43 (explaining that a quota system---"a program in which a certain number or proportion
of opportunities are reserved exclusively"-is impermissible, but that it is lawful for a
university to use race or ethnicity "in a good faith effort to come within a range" while still
ensuring that each candidate competes with all other qualified applicants);
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references, writing samples, interest, and course work. 171 So long as the hiring
decisions indeed rest on a multitude of factors, and the firm intends at some
identifiable point to thereafter eschew the use of race in making decisions, the
Court could, as in Johnson, conclude that the plan is "a moderate, gradual
approach to eliminating the imbalance in its work force, one which establishes
realistic guidance for employment decisions, and which visits minimal intrusion
on the legitimate expectations of other employees."'1 72 Again, while moving
toward a 30% goal may require a long-term commitment to the use of racial or
gender preferences, long-lasting preferences are tolerated under existing law. The
doctrinal alteration required here would be unhinging the target number from the
relevant labor pool and focusing instead on a target number associated with the
reduction or elimination of token status effects. It would not require a new way of
cabining employer discretion to engage in discrimination otherwise prohibited by
Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
I have tried to show that from the perspective of psychology and
organizational behavior theory (without reference to law) the problem of
workplace discrimination against blacks and women could be addressed if
employers changed the ways in which they recruit, hire, train, deploy, evaluate,
compensate, discipline, reward, and promote their employees. This body of
research also suggests that increasing the number of blacks and women in the jobs
in question would go a long way toward preventing outcomes for them that are
the product of conscious and unconscious stereotyping.
So why not require all employers to enact these affirmative action prevention
programs? First, as a practical matter, such a regime would be unworkable
because the target workforce representation suggested by the literature would
exceed, in many instances, the availability of blacks, for example, in the relevant
labor pool. Not all employers can attract a workforce that is 30% black where
171 Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 17, at 544-49 (discussing the hiring process at elite law
firms).
172 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640. The use of modest and measured preferences is suggested
by the theoretical and empirical work that justifies the prevention justification, even apart from
the Supreme Court's Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence. Large, obvious, rigid racial
preferences that impose a serious cost on identifiable individuals can lead to resentment,
hostility, and reinforced stereotypes along racial lines, as well as triggering unconscious racial
stereotypes by making race more, rather than less, salient. But these effects are significantly
diminished where race is only one criterion among other relevant merit-related criteria. See
supra Part II.A; cf Estlund, supra note 32, at 88-94 (concluding that because modest and
measured preferences do not trigger stereotypes or otherwise vitiate the beneficial effects of
cooperative interaction in the workplace across racial line, the results prescribed by her
integration thesis roughly mirror the current state of the Supreme Court's Title VII affirmative
action decisions).
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blacks constitute only 13% of the population. Moreover, such a regime would
send strong signals that would distort investments in human capital among
members of affected groups. 173 Finally, the research is merely suggestive and not
prescriptive. There is as yet no blueprint for implementing a successful program
that uses racial or gender preferences to prevent discrimination. Organizational
context and commitment will be important determinants of success. 174
Bringing law into the picture, the parallels are striking. The Supreme Court
has given employers incentives to take steps to prevent workplace discrimination
by making liability for certain types of discrimination and for punitive damages
turn on those employer efforts. There is no suggestion that the Court has
mandated that employers use preferences to try to prevent discrimination, but
what I have shown is that the Court's Title VII jurisprudence, if it can be taken
seriously on the importance of discrimination prevention, might permit the
voluntary use of racial or gender preferences in pursuit of the prevention
objective.
Is this much ado about nothing, on the theory that few employers will take
the operational and legal risks necessary to try to prevent discrimination by
restructuring the way they deal with people in the organization and by using race
and sex to allocate scarce employment resources? Not surprisingly, I do not think
so. Many firms, in fact, many leading firms in this economy, are already engaged
in ambitious workplace programs of encouraging and managing diversity. 175 And
while I have concluded that using preferences in the context of some of those
programs could be unlawful, those programs are evidence that employers are
willing to take operational and legal risks in pursuit of gaining a perceived
competitive advantage. 176 Employers might be willing to engage in similarly
ambitious prevention efforts on the theory that there are operational or
competitive advantages to wringing discrimination out of their human resource
systems. 177
As I sit here today, writing at a time when the business pages are full of
revelations about greedy managers looting corporate coffers in pursuit of their
self-interest, it seems naYve to suggest that employers might take steps to prevent
workplace discrimination because it is consistent with their conception of a just
society. However, I know there are individuals in management positions who
173 Strauss, supra note 114, at 1625.
174 Perestroika, supra note 3, at 1331.
175 See McGinley & Yelnosky, supra note 118, at 206-07; Brief for Amici Curiae 65
Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003) (No. 02-241 & No. 02-516).
176 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written that firms operate under a market-based
diversity constraint, which requires them to hire women and minorities to maintain their
legitimacy in the market. See The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, supra note 129.
177 See Selmi, supra note 6, at 1277-314.
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view that as part of their role, although they tend not to be the subjects of
newspaper stories. It is also unclear how many employers might follow if the
pioneering firms demonstrate how to effectively implement discrimination
prevention programs and manage diversity, which has been shown, in some
studies and over the long-haul, to result in better problem-solving and more
creative operation.178
Thus, to those who respond that this is a lot of ink spilled in defense of plans
that will be rare, I am reminded of my reaction to the words of Stephen Carter,
who has referred to affirmative action as "racial justice on the cheap."'179 I
certainly agree that affirmative action in employment is not responsive to the
needs of the most seriously disadvantaged, and that social policy should be
targeted at the underlying causes of continued racial disadvantage. But to the
extent that the kinds of plans I have outlined here advance in some small way the
cause of racial justice, and I believe they would, I will take my racial justice
anyway I can get it.
178 See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 40.
179 STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 71-72 (1991).

